Abstract. Wang et al. [Z.Wang, L.Wang, S.Zheng, Y.Yang and Z.Hu, International Journal of Network Security, 14(2012)33-38] proposed an identity-based signature scheme based on cubic residues. But the scheme is insecure because it cannot withstand a conspiracy attack by users. To overcome this security vulnerability, this paper proposes a novel method to compute a cubic root of a cubic residue. Then a modified identity-based signature scheme based on cubic residues is proposed. The security analysis results show that the modified scheme can resist the conspiracy attack.
Introduction
Shamir [1] firstly proposed an identity-based cryptography(IBC) in 1984.In an identity-based signature scheme, an entity's public key is derived directly from its identity, such as an e-mail address, or a social security number associated with a user. The private key is computed and issued secretly to the user by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). The main advantage of IBC is that it drastically reduces the needs for certificates. Boneh and Franklin [2] developed an identity based encryption scheme(BF-IBE) based on Weil pairing which is usually considered to be involved heavy computation. Very a few identity-based signature (IBS) schemes are without pairings. Saeednia [3] proposed an identity-based society oriented signature scheme with anonymous signers. Shao [4] showed that the scheme proposed by Saeednia is insecure. Lee and Liao [5] proposed an IBS scheme based on discrete logarithm problem. Qiu and Chen [6] presented an IBS scheme based on quadratic residues which is a combination of identity based and mediated cryptography. Chai et al. [7] proposed a new IBS scheme based on quadratic residues in 2007. They proved that their scheme is secure in the random oracle. Enos et al. [8] extended an ID based signcryption scheme to a compartmented scheme. C.Meshram [9] proposed to integrate forward security into ID-based encryption. Wang et al. [10] proposed an identity-based signature scheme based on cubic residues. If one selects proper parameters, the computational efficiency of constructing a cubic residue is better than constructing a quadratic residue. Unfortunately, according to our security analysis, their scheme cannot resist the users' conspiracy attack. To overcome this security weakness, we propose a novel method to compute a cubic root of a cubic residue and a modified scheme. The security analysis result shows that the modified scheme can resist the conspiracy attack. The scheme is also secure against existing forgery on the adaptively chosen message and identity attack under assumption of the hardness of integer factorization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief review of Wang et al.'s scheme and analyze its weakness. In Section 3, a modified identity-based signature scheme based on cubic residues is proposed. In Section 4, we give security analysis of the modified scheme. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section 5. ( ) (mod ). keys. Then, they conspirators can sign any message they like without taking responsibility.
Brief

A Modified Identity-based Signature Scheme Based on Cubic Residues
We now give a novel method to compute a cubic root of a cubic residue. ( 1)( 1) 3 (3 1)(9 6) 3 9 ( 1) (mod ).
a 3 l th root of δ could be efficiently computed as (mod ). We now propose a modified identity-based signature scheme which is established on cubic residues. The scheme is composed with 4 algorithms, namely Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify.
Setup ( , ) k l ：This algorithm will be carried out by the PKG. The algorithm takes in security parameters ( , ) k l . 1) Generate randomly two same length distinct prime numbers p and q such that
2) Select a non-cubic residue a modulus q . H ID H ID S S is a not valid key. As a result, in the modified scheme, the conspirators cannot get more useful information then a player does. Therefore the modified scheme withstands conspiracy attack and overcomes the weakness in the previously Wang et al.'s scheme. As in [10] , the modified scheme is also secure against forgery on the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks assuming the hardness of integer factorization.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have pointed out a security leak of Wang et al.'s scheme and further proposed a novel scheme, which not only keeps the merits of the previous scheme, but also remedies the security weakness.
